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There is a consensus that scientists should follow norms of transparency, openness, sincerity and honesty when communicating to non-expert audiences. For example, in an influential report, Wilsdon and Willis (2004) propose a “see-through science”; Philip Kitcher (2011, Chap.6) suggests that scientists should “open up” their research to public involvement; Nordmann (2011) argues that sincerity is essential if science is to promote civic well-being (see also Williams, 2002); Keohane, Lane and Oppenheimer write that honesty is “intrinsic to science: the sine qua non for this form of human activity” (2014, p.11); and it is a commonplace that scientists should be “honest” about uncertainty (Betz, 2012; Gelfert, 2013; Parker, 2014). Such claims are sometimes framed as (quasi-)ethical recommendations; scientists simply must be honest. Other times, they are framed as prudential advice; if scientists want non-experts to trust them, they should be open and transparent. Most often, it seems assumed that prudence and ethics coincide; in following these norms, scientists simultaneously gain others’ trust and render that trust well-placed. 

Unfortunately, just as publicising the inner workings of sausage factories does not necessarily promote sausage sales, so, too, transparency about knowledge production does not necessarily promote the flow of true belief throughout the population (and so on for honesty, sincerity and openness). Consider the leak of emails from the Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia (McAllister, 2012). One way of viewing “Climategate”, which I discuss more below, is as a massive experiment in transparency. Laying open the inner-workings of the climate change community did not, however, increase public trust in climate scientists. Rather, climate sceptics argued that these emails revealed a “broken” science (Delingpole, 2010). Of course, all this shows is that transparency does not necessarily generate epistemic deference. Maybe there are more fundamental ethical reasons for transparency. This paper argues against this possibility. Given an independently plausible account of how non-experts learn from experts, transparency, openness, sincerity, and honesty are not basic norms for ethical scientific communication.     

My argument has a simple structure. §1 provides a “unified account” of how non-experts learn from experts. §2 sketches the implications of this theory for claims that scientists should be sincere; §3, its implications for claims that they should be open and transparent; and §4 its implications for claims that they should be honest. In conclusion, I suggest an alternative norm to govern communication: against “wishful speaking”. My discussion focuses on debates over anthropogenic climate change. This case exemplifies the complexity of contemporary scientific communication, with claims originating from groups, rather than individuals, and passing through multiple intermediaries before reaching citizens and policy-makers. By studying it we avoid misrepresenting scientific communication as if it were an on-going conversation between two individuals of equal social and intellectual standing (compare Fricker 2002). Furthermore, climate change controversy vividly exemplifies a key issue for the ethics of communication generally: communication in contexts where speakers know that their words may be twisted and manipulated for others’ political or economic ends.

Before going any further, three clarifications may help. First, work on trust and expertise often focuses on epistemological puzzles: in particular, whether knowledge can be gained through expert testimony.​[1]​ This paper does not address these questions. All I assume is that the world is a better place if non-experts’ beliefs are informed by true experts’ claims, regardless of whether such beliefs constitute knowledge. Second, you might suspect that this paper will use uncommon definitions of terms such as honesty. I hope not. However, my aim is not to show that, on every specification of the term, honesty is not required. Rather, it is to show that certain platitudes – be honest! – inhibit our understanding of the ethical and epistemic complexities of science communication. The reader who pounces on every definition should ask herself whether she would be as zealous if this paper argued for familiar recommendations. Third, you might think that, even if what I say is correct, there is something problematic – particularly in the current context – with saying it; my argument might be twisted to help the enemies of science-based policy. I think the benefits of clarification outweigh the possible costs. However, if you have such concerns, then you are halfway towards agreeing with me: the ethics of scholarly communication is subject to norms beyond sincerity. 

1.	The unified model of learning from experts

We could try to ensure that non-experts’ beliefs mirror experts’ claims in many ways. A central issue in the ethics of science communication is to identify which are permissible. Some cases are simple: brainwashing is impermissible and rational argument is permissible. Others – such as the use of “framing” techniques (Elliot and McKaughan, 2013) – are more complex. I take claims about the importance of sincerity, transparency, and so on, as concerning the requirements on ethically permissible scientific speech. To identify the norms which should constrain and govern scientific communication we must first answer a prior question: how do non-experts learn from experts at all? 

Following Goldman (2001) most discussions of non-expert learning focus on cases where an individual putative expert offers some piece of testimony, or two or more putative experts offer conflicting testimony. Such models are often used to discuss public understanding of climate change (Anderson, 2011, Almassi, 2012). However, as the case of climate change exemplifies, much learning from experts is more complex than Goldman’s quasi-judicial model implies. In general, many scientific claims are “made” by groups, rather than by (easily identifiable) individual human testifiers (Kukla, 2010). In climate change controversies, for example, debate is dominated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a corporate body whose reports are “authored” by very many contributors (John, 2017). Whatever we say about whether corporate reports count as “testimony” (Hawley, 2016), groups such as the IPCC differ from human individuals (they don’t have qualifications, the sense in which they have “track records” is complex). Clearly, however, non-experts learn from these sources. 

Second, even when non-experts learn from individual human experts, what they are told often concerns the state of consensus in some scientific field, rather than the world itself.​[2]​ Many claims about climate change, encountered in the mass media or textbooks, for example, do not concern the climate. Rather, they are claims about the consensus among climate scientists about the climate. Learning about the climate on the basis of such claims involves identifying expertise on the subject of consensus in the climate change community – for which membership of that community may be a poor proxy (Collins and Evans, 2007) – and a further inferential leap: from believing that there is a consensus in that “expert” community that p to oneself believing that p. The latter step is not a given: I may believe that most “expert” astrologers believe there will be a miracle next month without myself believing that claim. 

There are multiple ways, then, in which non-experts learn about a scientific topic such as climate change. I will now argue that such learning can be modelled as a two premise inference.​[3]​ (I do not mean that we actually consciously engage in such inferences, but that our everyday practices of deference to scientific experts are grounded in assumptions – implicit unless challenged – which can be modelled in this way). The first I call the sociological premise:
Institutional structures are such that the best explanation for the factual content of	 some claim (made by a scientist, or group, or subject to some consensus) is that this claim meets scientific “epistemic standards” for proper acceptance
And, second, the epistemological premise: 
If some claim meets scientific epistemic standards for proper acceptance, then I should accept that claim as well.
I will now outline this model, provide some reasons to think it is accurate (or, at least, useful), and locate my arguments within the broader framework of debates over expertise. 

The first premise rests on the concept of “epistemic standards”: (implicit or explicit) rules which determine the kind and extent of evidential support which claims must enjoy before they are accepted, i.e. used as premises in further practical and theoretical reasoning (John, 2015). The institutional structures of epistemic groups typically aim to ensure that its members assert and accept claims only when those claims do, in fact, meet relevant standards. For example, mechanisms for accrediting individuals as experts ensure that only people with the skills for assessing whether claims meet epistemic standards are counted as such; systems for managing the public reporting of research, such as peer review, ensure that members assert only claims which meet those standards. To think that the institutional structures of an epistemic group are working well, then, is to think that when members of the community assert or agree on some claim, the best explanation for them agreeing on a claim with this specific empirical content is that the claim meets relevant epistemic standards. To clarify, this is consistent with there being very different explanations of such facts as why some individual makes the claim at some point in time. Maybe the best explanation of the fact that Suzy publishes a paper claiming that “climate change is real” is that she wants the “rewards” associated with publishing papers; this is compatible with the best explanation for Suzy’s claim having the content “climate change is real” being that this content is well-established, because the rewards of publication are contingent on publishing well-established claims (Williams, 2002, p142). Good institutions ensure that speakers enjoy rewards only when they make well-established claims (Kitcher, 1995). 

As the astrology example implies, I can think that a group is organised such that the sociological premise holds true – astrologers do assert claims only when those claims are well-established by astrological standards – but not accept those claims myself. Learning from non-experts also requires the second “epistemological” premise.​[4]​ I suggest that in modern societies we typically assume that the epistemic standards characteristic of scientific research communities should govern our own beliefs. This is why – at least for most – even if both the “scientific community” and the “astrological community” rigidly enforce their respective epistemic standards, a report of consensus in the first group carries more epistemic weight than a report of consensus in the second. 

On this two-step approach account there is no fundamental difference between learning from “direct testimony” (such as a scientist’s claim about the world) and learning from an awareness of consensus in the community (such as a trustworthy report of the state of scientific consensus). In both cases, acceptance involves an inference to the best explanation of the content of some claim, grounded in beliefs about socio-epistemic institutions. (Of course, there may be other, normatively relevant, differences between the two forms of learning). In Philip Nickel’s terminology (Nickel 2013), our entitlement to defer to scientific expert testimony is “norm-based”, not “assurance-based”; we learn from scientists via an assumption that, in virtue of certain sorts of social institutions, scientists’ claims are governed by an epistemic norm, rather than via reliance on their “assurance” for the truth of what they say. 

Why adopt this model? One reason is because it captures our usage of concepts such as “trust”. When someone says that she distrusts “scientists”, it is most natural to interpret her claims as expressing an attitude towards a kind of individual rather than a generalisation about the trustworthiness of many individuals. My approach makes sense of this phenomenon: trust in individual scientists involves an assumption that institutions ensure that some “social type” – the accredited scientist – is trustworthy, rather than an assumption that an individual has specific qualities indicated by institutional markers. (As such, it differs from Goldman’s model (2001), where institutional markers are defeasible evidence of an individual’s epistemic superiority).

 A second reason to adopt this model is that it is consistent with recent literature in the history and sociology of science on “agnotology”, the deliberate creation and maintenance of ignorance, typically undertaken for political or economic ends (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008). Agnotologists are experts on how non-scientists learn from scientists; their livelihood, after all, depends on preventing such learning! Following Oreskes and Conway (2010), I assume that many climate sceptics are “agnotologists” (see also Biddle and Leuschner 2015). Looking at the strategies they adopt supports my model of non-expert learning. One way in which to undermine public deference to mainstream climate science would be to claim that we should not, in general, trust scientific research methods. Interestingly, however, this is not the strategy “climate sceptics” adopt. (It may, however, characterise some environmentalist concerns; see Yearley, 2005). Although climate sceptics are sometimes accused of being “un-” or “anti-” scientific (Torcello 2016; Lewandowsky, Cook and Lloyd (forthcoming)), their arguments often appeal to science as a source of knowledge, painting themselves as latter-day Galileos (Hayward, 2010). What they do argue is that the institutional arrangements of climate science are such that climate scientists’ political concerns and goals – to promote an anti-capitalist agenda, for example – provides a better explanation for the contents of their claims than does the fact that these claims are scientifically well-established. This is the pattern of attack we would expect if non-expert trust in science works as suggested above: given the widespread deference to scientific methods in our community, there is little mileage in arguing that even if climate scientists’ claims met scientific standards, non-experts still should not trust them (attacking the “epistemic premise”). Rather, the best strategy is to attack the “sociological premise”; the institutions which incentivise climate scientists to assert claims are such that we cannot assume that their claims are, in fact, scientifically well-established.​[5]​





One common claim about the ethics of science communication in general – and climate science in particular – is that scientists should be “sincere”. I take “sincerity” to mean the virtue of fitting one’s public claims to one’s private attitudes; to be sincere, an agent’s public assertions must accurately reflect what she herself believes. My account of how non-experts learn from experts suggests that it is pointless, and sometimes even dangerous, to insist that experts should be “sincere”. In this section, I sketch these arguments, providing further reasons to adopt the model above: it explains how non-experts learn from “artificial consensus”, where scientists agree to treat some statement as a “consensus position”, even when they do not fully agree with it.  

A popular claim in social epistemology is that a hearer can come to know some claim p on the basis of a speaker’s claim that p only if the speaker herself knows that p (Graham, 2000). Jennifer Lackey (2012, Chap.2) has provided a counter-example of a High School biology teacher who is a committed Creationist, but hides this fact from her students, instead teaching Darwinian theory. It seems that the students gain knowledge from the teacher’s testimony. However, the teacher herself cannot be said to know Darwinian theory (given the assumption that belief is necessary for knowledge). As Lackey notes, her example also has implications for the claim that proper assertion requires sincerity. The creationist teacher is insincere, but this does not undermine the propriety of her speech.

Why not? One answer, building on Sorensen (2012) is that what the teacher says is proper given the social role she is playing. (Strictly, this isn’t quite what Lackey concludes (Lackey, 2012, Chap.4), but that’s for another paper). These considerations dovetail with the account of learning from experts in Section 1; when non-experts learn from a scientific expert, they do so on the basis of the assumption that her claims meet certain epistemic standards. The propriety of what she says does not turn on whether she believes those claims. “Sincerity” is simply irrelevant to the ethics of science communication. You might think this point rather unimportant because Lackey-style cases are exotic (Gelfert, 2016, 152). However, demands for sincerity are not only misguided, but dangerous. 

There are cases where scientists properly believe some claim which it would be improper for them to assert. For example, it may be proper to believe certain claims about climate change on the basis of non-peer-reviewed evidence, but improper to assert them (assuming that claims can only properly be asserted when they have been scrutinised by others). Debates over whether new evidence about the melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet should be communicated to policy-makers, via IPCC reports, turned precisely on concerns that such reports – even if plausible – were not yet published in peer-reviewed journals (John, 2016).​[6]​ Furthermore, there may be cases where some claim would be proper to assert, but where a scientist simply cannot bring herself to believe it. For example, in the absence of any known biological mechanism linking placing babies on their back and reduced incidence of cot death, a physician may find it difficult to believe that “placing your baby on its back reduces the risk of cot death”. Still, this is a claim she could properly – indeed may be obliged to – assert to parents (Sorensen, 2012). Treating “sincerity” as a sufficient condition for proper speech risks legitimating improper speech in the first case; treating it as a necessary condition rules out proper speech in the second.​[7]​ Either way, a sincerity condition causes confusion. (Of course, one could redefine “sincere scientific speech” as speech which mirrors what a scientist believes to be well-established rather than speech which mirrors what she herself believes. I can see the theoretical appeal of this move, but it hardly avoids confusion.)  

A second reason to stress that sincerity is not a virtue is that doing so helps us to avoid some confusions around two tricky cases of learning from experts: those involving corporate testimony and those involving “artificial consensus”. As an example of both phenomena, consider the “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, a non-governmental body, whose Assessment Reports aim to provide a comprehensive overview of current scientific consensus on climate change.​[8]​ IPCC reports do not involve primary data collection and research, but synthesise the literature. This involves a massive collaborative effort, involving multiple authors and reviewers from across the world, with a strong focus on consensus.​[9]​ Given that climate change is a complex topic which cuts across traditional scientific boundaries, such reports seem essential resources for the non-expert. 

However, there is something odd about learning from the IPCC. Either we interpret the IPCC’s Reports as themselves an instance of direct testimony or as a report of an “expert consensus”. Either way, we face a puzzle: who or what is making the claims in the IPCC’s Reports? No human individual could believe all of the claims in an IPCC Report. On the other hand, even if some corporate bodies can have beliefs – which is controversial (Hawley, 2016) – the IPCC seems to lack standard markers of corporate personhood. The model outlined in Section 1 implies that these puzzles are illusory. If learning from experts involves assumptions about the best explanation for the production of some written or spoken text, whether or not we should believe the IPCC’s reports is simply a question of whether the institutional structures which generate such reports are working well. That no individual – human or corporate – believes those reports raises interesting questions, but is not of fundamental relevance to assessing the propriety of claims in IPCC Reports. The (apparently harmless) platitude that speech must be sincere confuses us by leading us to look for a believer.​[10]​
  
A focus on institutional arrangements can also resolve a second confusion, which may also be compounded by a misplaced focus on sincerity. In Section 1, I argued that we can learn from a report of group consensus. Given that the IPCC conducts no primary research, it is tempting to think of its claims as reports of a group consensus, much as a science journalist might report the current consensus in geology. However, this misrepresents the nature and production of IPCC reports. Through the process of discussion and collaboration, it can become clearer which claims are established and how. As such, the end “product” seems to sit in-between a report of scientists’ opinions and an instance of “direct testimony”. What kind of claim is the IPCC making? To address this question, we can distinguish between two kinds of consensus: “natural” and “artificial”. In a “natural consensus”, members of a group each arrive at the same conclusion independently (or quasi-independently) of each other. For example, different scientists might each reach the same conclusion about the chemical composition of some material on the basis of different experiments. In an “artificial consensus”, members of a group explicitly agree to let some claim stand as the group consensus, even if each individual harbours reservations.​[11]​ The IPCC’s Reports involve the second kind of consensus. It might seem that there is an important difference between “natural” and “artificial” consensus: natural agreement on some claim may seem best explained by the truth of that claim, whereas artificial agreement seems better explained as the result of sociological pressures. Once we know how the IPCC’s reports are produced, we might be tempted to downplay their epistemic significance. 

However, the theory above suggests that such a move is misguided: even if the fact that members of the IPCC agreed on a claim is best explained in terms of social pressures, it does not follow that the best explanation for why they agreed on the particular claim they agreed upon must refer to social pressures. Rather, institutional pressures can incentivise actors to agree only on well-established claims. There is no fundamental epistemic difference in learning from a “natural” and an “artificial” consensus. Why might we think that they are different? Again, I suggest that we are led astray because we (implicitly) assume a “sincerity” condition on good communication. In a natural consensus, typically, each individual comes to accept some claim, which she then asserts; in an artificial consensus, it is possible that each member of the group may be willing to endorse some statement as the group’s assertion while, herself, not accepting that claim.​[12]​ Therefore, when we encounter a statement of artificial consensus and discover many “contributors” to that consensus (“privately”) disagree, we may mistakenly infer that something has gone wrong.​[13]​ 

Is “sincerity” valuable? The first part of this section argued that the two premise model of learning from scientific experts implies that it is not. In the second part, I provided further indirect evidence for that model: that it helps us to understand how non-experts can learn from corporate testimony and from artificial consensus (and, as with the IPCC, from corporate statements of artificial consensus). The distinction I drew between a “natural” and an “artificial” consensus may be artificial; rather, as Miller (2013) has argued on broadly Kuhnian grounds, “scientific consensus” in general may be closer to a “joint commitment”, or what I have called “artificial” consensus. This possibility does not weaken, but strengthens my arguments; the less we should treat scientific consensus as many people articulating the same thought, then the more dangerous it is to treat sincerity as a central norm for science communication. 

3. Against openness and transparency

A proper account of the ethics of science communication should move away from a focus on individual virtues to institutional structures. However, it may seem unreasonable – or even unethical – to expect non-experts to learn from experts when the process whereby those claims are produced is shrouded in secrecy. Hence, my arguments may have challenged one platitude in the ethics of science communication – scientists should be sincere – only to reinforce others: that scientists should be open or transparent. Sometimes such claims are made as part of a larger theoretical framework according to which greater public involvement in science has ethical or epistemic benefits (Wilsdon and Willis 2004). In this paper, I place these issues to one side to focus on the roles of transparency and openness in securing learning from experts.​[14]​ 

There have been a series of cases where climate sceptics have used email hacks, Freedom of Information Requests, and so on, to undermine climate science (Lewandowsky et al, 2016). One might think such demands for transparency are merely attempts at obfuscation or intended to complicate (and slow down) the research process (Biddle and Leuschner, 2016). As such, they do not show that transparency is unimportant, but that this norm can be abused. However, I suggest that they point to a deeper problem: epistemic trust in science may be “fragile”, because based on a false “folk philosophy of science”. To introduce these concepts, consider the most high-profile case of “enforced transparency”: the furore caused by leaked emails from the University of East Anglia’s Centre for Climate Change Research. In this case, climate sceptics claimed that these emails showed that the climate scientists at UEA were engaged in “non-” or “anti-” scientific practices, for example by confusing correlation and causation, by refusing to include certain data sets in their analyses, by refusing to publish papers by certain authors, and so on (Delingpole, 2012, Chap.2).  

If the scientists were not acting as they should, then, of course, the public would be right to mistrust them! In turn, given the complexities of climate science, it is contestable whether many research practices do generate reliable predictions (Werndl, Frigg and Thompson, 2015). However, the practices which sceptics decried as “unscientific” were, typically, normal and respectable; inferring causation from sufficient types and kinds of correlations is standard, justifiable scientific procedure (Papineau, 2012, Chap.9); refusing to publish some kinds of work is part of the “dogmatism” necessary to promote “progressive research projects” (Lakatos, 1978); ignoring recalcitrant or strange data sets is a justifiable response to the uncertainties of data collection (McAllister, 2012); and so on. I argued above that epistemic trust is based on a sociological premise: that, in virtue of various social institutions, people credentialed as scientists can reasonably be expected to assert claims (in their role as scientists) only when those claims meet proper epistemic standards. Climategate suggests a problem, that non-experts can have false beliefs about what epistemic and social practices should be like for the sociological premise to be true. For example, they might believe that the social structures of science should constantly encourage debate and discussion when, in fact, dogmatism is epistemically useful. Climate scepticism often works by appealing to (and perhaps creating) such a false “folk philosophy of science”.  

This possibility suggests an important complexity in our account of well-placed trust. Consider a non-expert who – prior to the release of the UEA emails – was willing to defer to climate scientists because she believed that she should defer to claims which meet scientific epistemic standards (the epistemological premise) and that, in virtue of social institutions, climate scientists’ claims were likely to meet these standards (the sociological premise). Assume that the second premise was true: climate scientists’ claims were, in fact, likely to meet high epistemic standards. In this sense, then, the non-expert’s trust in climate scientists was well-placed. Imagine further, however, that the non-expert also held a false “folk philosophy of science”. In this case, even if the non-expert’s trust was in fact warranted, it was “fragile”; had she been aware of how the scientists reached their results, then she would have removed her (warranted) trust.   

An attitude of trust can be warranted and robust or warranted and fragile or unwarranted and fragile or (worst of all) unwarranted and robust. These distinctions ground a four step argument for caution about “openness” and “transparency”. First, the successes of agnotology suggest that, although many non-experts have an (I assume warranted) generalised trust in science, their trust is sometimes based on a “false philosophy of science”, and, as such, is fragile. (This is not to denigrate people as stupid: we are all routinely exposed to extremely idealised and unrealistic normative models of scientific inquiry). Second, therefore, as in Climategate, transparency and openness may destroy warranted trust. Third, non-experts’ epistemic interests are better-served when they have warranted trust in experts than when they do not, even if that warranted trust is fragile. Fourth, claims about experts’ communicative obligations towards non-experts should, ultimately, be grounded in claims about what will further non-experts’ epistemic interests. Therefore, demands that scientists should be transparent are not well-grounded when non-experts hold a false philosophy of science. Indeed, sometimes, being transparent may be positively (epistemically) harmful to non-experts. If we care about the promotion of true belief, we should not demand that scientists are transparent and open. 

Three features of this conclusion require clarification. First, it turns on the premise that non-experts hold a “false folk philosophy of science”. There are many good reasons to combat such false views. In the long-term, combined with educational programmes, transparency and openness may promote trust which is both warranted and robust. Unfortunately, in cases such as climate change, we cannot wait for a better world. Second, the argument depends on trust in scientists being in fact warranted. There are many ways in which such trust might not be warranted; for example, if those accredited as scientists are simply incompetent. Furthermore, (contestable) value judgments might be smuggled into scientific practice, undermining assumptions that audiences should – in a straightforwardly epistemic sense – defer to the “scientific consensus”. I certainly do not deny such problems. What I deny, rather, is that transparency and openness will necessarily solve them. Third, you might worry that hiding the workings of a system is deceitful. I concede this concern. However, the relevant wrong, while regrettable, may be mitigated by the fact that transparency would not lead to understanding, but to greater confusion. Imagine that a physician is an excellent diagnostician. Her patient believes that this is because she has a great intuitive genius. In fact, the physician is excellent at using complex disease databases. It might be regrettable, but still all-things-considered, justifiable for the physician to hide her actual practices from the patient. Of course, “playing along” with false views of proper practice may compound those views, hence undermining the long-term goal of building a more realistic view of practice. While these are important concerns, it is unclear that the potential long-term benefits of transparency must outweigh the short-term costs.   





In the previous section, I provided a theoretical framework – distinguishing between trust as warranted and trust as robust – for understanding the dangers of transparency and openness in the specific context of scientific research. One concern about those arguments is that they rest on an assumption that we can easily identify claims as “well-established”, and, hence, fit for public acceptance. Science is, however, messy. There can be legitimate disagreement or uncertainty over the interpretation of data, over whether a hypothesis is well-supported and to what degree, and so on. I take it that many concerns articulated in terms of sincerity, openness or transparency are better understood as concerns that scientists should acknowledge, rather than obscure, such epistemic uncertainty. Scientists should be “honest”, in the sense that they should make hearers aware of the limitations of, and alternatives to, their claims. My final target, then, is the familiar claim that scientists should honestly report uncertainties. 

Wendy Parker (2014) sets out an interesting problem about the communication of uncertainty. Climate scientists are sometimes able to generate precise probabilistic estimates of likely effects of future climate change, but are aware that there are significant uncertainties around those estimates (for example, because of assumptions used in their models). Often, they report the more precise estimate to policy-makers. Parker suggests that this preference stems, in part, from the fact that we have better-developed tools for calculating precise estimates than for gauging second-order uncertainty. However, a second reason why scientists might offer precise estimates is because they are more likely to translate into policy than are coarser estimates, hedged with epistemic qualifiers. Some scientists have argued that the IPCC’s choice to use vague qualitative assessments, rather than precise numerical projections, of ice-sheet loss in the West Antarctic was problematic, because it made inaction more likely (Hansen, 2007). Policy-makers themselves seem to require more certainty than careful experts can provide; in the old joke, attributed to President Truman, politicians want a “one-handed economist”. 

Assume, then, that a climate scientist knows that she could report a single precise probability estimate to policy-makers, and doing so would secure that policy-maker’s action against climate change. However, she cannot (in Parker’s terms) “own” that prediction; at best, she can “offer” it, because she is aware that her estimate is subject to significant “second-order uncertainty”. Unfortunately, reporting these uncertainties would be more likely to lead to inaction. I presume a proponent of “honesty” thinks that the scientist should, still, communicate the less precise estimate, because doing otherwise is “dishonest”, in the sense that the scientist would be representing the precise estimate as enjoying a privileged status which it lacks.

However, this case is more complex than it might at first seem. Even if scientists’ role in policy-making should be restricted to informing policy-makers – rather than influencing their decisions – proper informing involves more than accurately reporting (the epistemic status of) claims. As Neil Manson and Onora O’Neill (2007) discuss in the context of medical ethics, effective informing of others requires that one seek to ensure that one’s hearer takes up and understands one’s claim. For example, a researcher who lists side effects of some research project, hiding a significant risk in the small print, may report the facts accurately, but fail to inform a potential trial participant of the risks of participation. As Manson and O’Neill stress, good “informing” should be guided by a clear sense of an audience’s needs and interests, including how they will respond to our claims. 

Once we recognise that informing is more complex than reporting, certain forms of (apparent) “dishonesty” may be ethically justifiable. A simple parable helps make this controversial point (note that this example concerns a different kind of “dishonesty”, of exaggeration). Consider a shepherd newly appointed to her role. Unfortunately, because of the previous shepherd’s antics, the villagers are desensitised to calls of “wolf” (whoever makes them). The shepherd sees a wolf is about to eat some sheep from the communal flock. She knows that the villagers will want to know that there is a wolf present, but that a cry of “wolf” will not lead them to form that belief. She also knows, however, that the villagers will respond to a call of “a band of wolves”. By the villagers’ own lights, they would prefer to have a belief “that the sheep are in danger” than not, even if that belief is based on a belief – “the sheep are in danger from a band of wolves” – which is false. So, she cries that there is a band of wolves.  

Although the shepherd’s calls are dishonest they differ from paradigm cases of dishonesty. Imagine you ask if your new haircut is nice. I think it is awful, but do not want to upset you, so say that it is. In this case, I say something false because I think you will be happier if you believe (that I believe) that you have a nice haircut. Even such “white lies” may seem ethically problematic, because they disrespect one’s hearers by treating their beliefs as means to non-epistemic ends. In the case of the shepherd, by contrast, her utterance does not involve an intention to deceive the villagers for the sake of their (or her) non-epistemic well-being. Rather, her false utterance is intended to improve the villagers’ epistemic situation. (To make this clear, imagine that the shepherd thinks that the villagers would be prudentially better-off not chasing the wolf; her choice is intended solely to promote the villagers’ epistemic, rather than their all-things-considered, well-being). 

The shepherd has a choice between making an honest assertion and making an effective assertion, where by “effective” I mean an assertion which would secure uptake of some claim which is in the villagers’ epistemic interest to believe. In her role as an informant, she should make the “effective” claim, rather than the “honest” claim.​[16]​ What holds true for the shepherd’s exaggerated claim may also hold true when scientists make “spuriously precise” claims. If a scientist knows that reporting a point estimate without adding further qualifications is likely to lead a policy-maker to some conclusion which it is in her epistemic interests to believe – such as that “climate change will lead to ice sheet collapse” – whereas a more “honest” estimate is unlikely to lead to such belief – the policy-maker will disregard her advice as too complex – then she may be justified in making the first, spuriously precise estimate. At least sometimes, climate scientists are in such situations, particularly given that, in an agnotological environment, admissions of uncertainty are likely to be treated as evidence of incompetence or grounds for scepticism.​[17]​

Note that these arguments in favour of dishonest-but-epistemically-effective communication are compatible with a strong presumption in favour of honesty. First, where policy-makers are listening carefully, honest communication will clearly lead to even better epistemic consequences than will dishonest communication. Therefore, the default should be honesty. Second, in many cases, a scientist’s reason for making dishonest-but-epistemically-effective claims may be the (perceived) non-epistemic effects of doing so; for example, the scientist may wish to the policy-maker to believe that the ice caps are melting because she thinks that this will prompt positive action. Nothing I have said rules out such speech, as long as the epistemic effects are positive; i.e. the ice caps are melting. However, it may sometimes be tempting to communicate a false claim (whether honestly or dishonestly), because one values the non-epistemic consequences that might follow; for example, to convince a policy-maker that London is at imminent risk of flooding so as to prompt action on climate change. Such speech is, I assume, impermissible. (For more on “wishful speaking” see the Conclusion). However, it is easy to see how a licence for the first kind of speech may be abused as a license for the second. Therefore, there may be good reasons to treat honesty as the default.       

This is, of course, not a blanket endorsement of dishonesty! There are important limits on permissible dishonesty: most notably, it must be the case that we can reasonably assume that, absent the dishonest statement, the policy-maker would be epistemically worse-off than she would have been otherwise. The argument does not endorse a scientist making some dishonest claim  solely because doing so would have beneficial non-epistemic consequences, regardless of its effect on the policy-maker’s epistemic well-being. Furthermore, as with transparency, it may be that dishonesty is justified only because of other features of the policy-making environment. However, given that scientists are often in non-ideal epistemic environments, honesty is not always the ethically best policy.  





My two-step model of learning from experts implies a series of negative conclusions: we should be suspicious of putative norms of sincerity, honesty, openness and transparency. Esposuals of such norms are, at best, irrelevant and, at worst, dangerous. Furthermore, I have stressed that, even if these demands do express ideals, good communication may require recognition that scientists inhabit a far-from-ideal epistemic environment, of agnotologists and confused policy-makers. Ignoring such complexities may keep scientists’ hands clean, but at the cost of non-experts’ epistemic interests.  

What, though, can be said in a more positive vein? The key ethical demand in science communication is simple: to communicate only those claims which are well-established. Unfortunately, this demand is difficult to meet, because it is difficult to know when claims are well-established, and, more importantly, because it is often tempting to seek to communicate ill-established claims for non-epistemic ends. It is, I suggest, the latter vice – which I call “wishful speaking” – which is central to the ethics of science communication. For example, when climate sceptics claim that climate scientists make ill-established claims to promote their (non-epistemic) aim of greater regulation, while climate scientists accuse climate sceptics of making ill-established claims to promote the interests of industry, both sides are accusing the other of engaging in “wishful speaking”. Quite apart from its deleterious epistemic consequences, “wishful speaking” is ethically wrong because it disrespects audiences by treating their beliefs as mere means to be manipulated for further non-epistemic ends. 

We can understand the apparent appeal of the other alleged virtues in terms of concerns about “wishful speaking”. For example, we might believe that if institutions are “open” or “transparent”, then it is easier to check whether scientists are speaking wishfully. Similarly, at least when dealing with an individual speaker, insincerity can be evidence of “wishful speaking”. Being “honest” about uncertainty may help clarify which claims are well-established. However, these norms can backfire: openness and transparency may, combined with a false philosophy of science, lead hearers to reject “well-established claims”; we may treat insincerity as evidence of “wishful speaking” even in contexts such as “forced consensus” where this virtue is idle; and communicating well-established claims may sometimes require our actual assertions are dishonest. Of course, maybe in the long run we best ensure that scientists avoid “wishful speaking” by inculcating virtues of honesty, or by creating “transparent” institutional structures. However, this is an empirical question. It is a mistake to think that these are basic ethical demands which apply both to ideal and non-ideal settings.​[18]​    
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^1	  For an overview, see Gelfert 2014
^2	  See Cook and Lewandowsky (2016) for evidence that such statements can influence non-experts’ beliefs. 
^3	  In terms of the larger debate over testimony this approach builds on Lipton 1998, but I do not necessarily claim that all learning from testimony must be understood in inferentialist terms.
^4	  This is the key difference between the account offered here and Miller’s argument (Miller, 2013) that we learn from consensus only when the best explanation of that consensus is that it is “knowledge-based”. As far as I can tell, Miller’s account, focused on sociological aspects of the community, cannot distinguish between deference to climate scientists and deference to astrologers. (I am grateful to Audrey Harnagel for exceptionally useful discussion of related topics).   
^5	  My claims imply reservations about the strategy of attacking climate sceptics on the grounds that their own views fail to meet scientific standards (see, for example, Lewandowsky Cook, and Lloyd, E (forthcoming)). Responding to an accusation that you are unscientific by showing that the accuser is unscientific isn’t really responding to her attack at all.   
^6	  These comments relate to the larger issue of how scientific norms of reticence may, inadvertently, mislead audiences (Brysse et al 2013; John, 2016).
^7	  These comments build on McKaughan’s (2012) concerns about using Searle’s account of assertion – which treats sincerity as a necessary condition for propriety – to model scientific speech.
^8	  See IPCC “Organization” http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.Ugzv9W1Jp-w (accessed 10th Aug, 2016)
^9	  See IPCC, “Principles and procedures” http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_procedures.shtml#.UgpQg21Jp-w (accessed 13 August, 2013)
^10	  These comments are compatible with holding that if an individual speaker reports the results of an IPCC consensus, her report is proper only if she believes that the IPCC’s processes are a good way of generating well-established claims. Still, what seems important for a non-expert’s belief is whether the processes are, in fact, good, not whether the speaker “sincerely” believes they are. (I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising these issues).   
^11	  Beatty and Moore (2010) describe such as consensus as “deliberative acceptance”, but it is unclear to me that the relevant consensus must be based on “deliberation” as opposed to, for example, agreement to abide by a judgment aggregation mechanism (see Pettit and List, 2014). Therefore, I prefer the broader term.
^12	  You might worry that such a consensus must be epistemically problematic if each “privately” accepts different claims as well-established; however, there may be reasonable disagreement over what counts as “well-established”, such that both the endorsed claim and the, different, “private” claim count as reasonable to accept 
^13	  As Beatty and Moore (2010) charmingly acknowledge, Beatty (2006) may be a nice example of such an error.
^14	  Much of what follows chimes with concerns that transparency and openness are not always unalloyed goods in the political sphere (O’Neill, 2002, Fung, 2013) but my concern is more narrowly with the relationship between transparency and epistemic trust.
^15	  I am very grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.
^16	  This may be a particularly dramatic example of “epistemic paternalism”, as defended by Ahlstrom-Vij (2013); unlike his cases of controlling the flow of information, however, this case involves deliberately dishonest assertion.
^17	  Budescu et al (2014) suggest that audiences routinely misinterpret the IPCC’s statements of uncertainty. They do not propose dishonesty as a response, but their work relates to my argument: providing accurate statements of uncertainty does not always equate to communicating well.
^18	  Previous versions of this material were presented at the Society for Philosophy of Science Practice Conference (Aarhus), at a workshop on Manufactured Dissent in Climate Science (Karlsruhe), and at the Department of Science Communication, Peking University. I am grateful to audiences at each of these venues for their feedback. I am also grateful to Angela Breitenbach, Gabriele Badano, Charlotte Goodburn, Emily McTernan and Axel Gelfert for comments on previous drafts of this paper. Finally, an anonymous reviewer for this journal made some exceptionally penetrating comments.  
